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EU-ACP ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EPA): IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT REVENUE, OUTPUT VOLATILITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN NIGERIA – AN INTEGRATED MODEL

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ABSTRACT

The Cotonou Agreement (CA) of 2000 set in motion negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU). The EU’s core demand is that ACP countries reduce the tariffs they apply to EU imports, through a set of evolving cooperation requirements that would eventually lead to zero tariffs by 2020. Many studies have examined the trade and growth effects of the agreement should it be implemented. This study adds a country-specific perspective by examining how the arrangement would affect Nigeria’s government revenue structure and, through it, output volatility and income inequality. It uses two analytical approaches. First, a Computable General Equilibrium simulation (CGES) estimates the impact of 0 percent and 25 percent tariff regimes on government oil and non-oil revenue, comparing the cases in which oil is treated as tradable and as non-tradable. Second, the results of the CGE simulation are used as inputs to a partial equilibrium simulation (PES) of the macroeconomic instability and inequality implications of the changing revenue structure. The results show that the EU-ACP arrangement would raise revenue from the oil sector at the expense of the non-oil sector. They also show that a fall in government revenue would increase macroeconomic instability and inequality-induced output volatility, although the size of the effect depends on whether oil is treated as tradable in the negotiations and on how alternative revenue is generated to offset the loss. If oil is modelled as tradable, a maximum 25 percent tariff on EU imports would raise output volatility but reduce inequality, which suggests that oil revenue masks the negative welfare effects of the partnership. A zero tariff regime, whether or not oil is tradable, would increase macroeconomic instability and inequality-induced output volatility.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Trade liberalisation, whether as an experiment or as institutionalised policy, has long been the subject of debate about its implications for growth, with some stressing its benefits for growth and others its exposure of economies to external shocks. There is nonetheless a shared understanding of the importance of trade and of the shocks that come with it. Trade is desirable for growth, but it carries economic costs that can harm people’s welfare, and it is this welfare dimension and its management that now dominate trade policy analysis. Globalisation has brought, and will continue to bring, large benefits to the countries that take part in it. It also creates pressures that raise inequality in some countries and require structural adjustment in all. It leaves some countries more exposed to external economic shocks, in the form of output, income and expenditure volatility, and it poses risk management challenges that have not yet been adequately addressed. In particular, there is a need to understand better the risks faced by the poorer and less-skilled members of society and their difficulty in coping with economic change and shocks. Empirical work on Nigeria is consistent with these concerns: Abanikanda and Dada (2024) show that external shocks generate macroeconomic volatility in Nigeria, and that the depth and structure of the financial system influence how much of that volatility reaches output and prices.

It follows that countries may not close their economies to external trade, but they should open them with caution, by moderating the degree of openness gradually. Over the last decade, however, Nigeria, together with other developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, has arguably over-stretched its domestic economy’s exposure to external trade shocks by entering into several trade and economic partnership arrangements. One of these is the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The EPA is a preferential trade arrangement under which all goods entering the customs territory of any EU-ACP country attract the same rate of customs duty. It also proposes to create market access and concessions between the EU and participating African regional groups and Pacific countries, and it is expected to establish integrated African regions that open further to intra-regional and inter-regional imports. Under the agreement, EPAs were to be negotiated during a preparatory period ending no later than 31 December 2007, formal negotiations were to begin in September 2002, and the new trading arrangements were to enter into force by 1 January 2008, unless the parties agreed on earlier dates (Article 37, paragraph 1).

The EU’s basic demand is that ACP countries reduce the tariffs they apply to EU imports, through a set of evolving cooperation requirements that would eventually lead to zero tariffs by 2020, after a transition of twelve years. If the recommendation of the African Commission were adopted, the transition could extend to 2028, a period of twenty years. Since the EU-ACP negotiations began under the Lomé conventions, now the Cotonou Agreement, there have been competing views of what the EU’s interest is and of what ACP countries should seek. Two dimensions can be distinguished: the trade and trade-related dimension and the development dimension. The EU looks forward to an enlarged market in ACP countries, together with increased aid and trade-related development policies there. ACP countries, whose products are less competitive, expect in the end to rely on aid as a cushion against the anticipated unfavourable trade balance and loss of revenue.

Whatever the respective interests, many studies have examined the likely implications of the agreement for Nigeria’s domestic economy. They cover trade creation and trade diversion, growth, debt, poverty and other trade-related effects. Recent work continues this tradition. Onogwu et al. (2019), for instance, estimate the consumption, revenue, welfare, trade creation and trade diversion effects of tariff elimination on Nigeria’s agricultural imports from the EU, and they recommend that Nigeria follow a graduated schedule of tariff reductions, with the revenue lost in each period compensated annually through aid for trade. All of these implications are, however, mainly direct trade effects. They largely ignore the spillover effects, such as the degree of inequality the agreement would generate, macroeconomic volatility, the implications of the revenue structure and its composition (oil and non-oil revenue), and the pressure on fiscal responsibility that arises as that structure and composition change. Both the direct and the indirect effects must be assessed in order to establish the full impact of the EU-ACP partnership agreement on the Nigerian economy.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria’s potential in international trade arrangements is held back by numerous constraints, including the high cost of doing business, inadequate infrastructure, poorly implemented incentives (fiscal and tariff regimes), massive smuggling, lack of standardisation and unfavourable international trade rules and practices. In 2003 and 2004 the government reintroduced import prohibitions on products without certificates of origin as a policy measure. The fiscal measures in the 2005 Budget then committed Nigeria fully to adopting the tariff structure of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, from the French Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine), which is 35 percent lower than Nigeria’s average tariff rate, within the framework of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET), which has four tariff bands. The CET is designed to introduce a uniform tariff structure for goods within the ECOWAS sub-region. Other market access arrangements that Nigeria has entered into include the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), established in 2000 to give Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African countries preferential market access and trade opportunities, and the ongoing EU-ACP Partnership Agreement.

Despite these arrangements, Nigeria’s non-oil trade balance, and in many cases its total trade balance, shows persistent deficits alongside a large fiscal deficit. Available statistics indicate that the EU’s imports from Nigeria (oil and non-oil) between 1999 and 2006 were initially more than twice those from ACP countries as a group, rising to a high in 1999 of about 56.5 percent before declining by about 37.6 percent in 2004 and 21 percent in 2005. Over the same period EU exports to Nigeria grew by 25 percent in 1999, fell by 12 percent in 2004 and picked up again by 14 percent in 2005. A further breakdown shows that Nigeria’s non-oil trade balance was consistently in deficit, growing from Euro 3.1 billion in 2000 to Euro 5.2 billion in 2006, an increase of about 42 percent, while the total trade balance rose from 2.4 percent in 2002 to about 3.7 percent in 2006. On average, trade between the EU-25 and Nigeria was worth about Euro 5,711.6 million. Between 2000 and 2006 Nigeria earned an average of Euro 743.1 million a year from tariffs on non-oil imports, so a zero tariff would imply a revenue loss of the same size, or 0.71 percent of 2006 GDP.

Studies of the trade and development implications of the EU-ACP partnership for West Africa have found that most countries in the region, Nigeria included, would lose revenue as a result of the agreement. Nigeria is reported to have lost approximately N50 billion to trade liberalisation and trade waivers in the period leading up to 2006, which brings the total loss to N91.29 billion over two years, an annual average of N45.65 billion, or about 0.34 percent of 2006 GDP. By 2020, a period of 14 years, Nigeria would have lost an average of N639 billion to trade waivers. Earlier simulation studies also estimated Nigeria’s loss from EPAs at 2.3 to 3.3 percent of GDP, an average of about 2.8 percent of 2005 GDP. These figures raise questions about the likely implications of deeper trade liberalisation that opens the Nigerian economy to the EU, with an eventual zero tariff rate in 2020. Recent assessments reinforce the concern that tariff elimination carries a fiscal cost and that its management is a central issue (Onogwu et al., 2019).

The size and effect of this loss depend on how far imports rise and on how far their prices fall in the domestic market. Lower tariffs and a high degree of openness are expected to compound the revenue loss and to generate other welfare problems, such as macroeconomic volatility and greater revenue-expenditure volatility (attributable to oil price shocks). This will in turn increase the fiscal burden and responsibility by altering the composition of public sector revenue. An immediate reaction is that cutting tariffs will reduce government revenue, which in the limit implies zero tariff revenue. More importantly, there is a danger that government will raise other taxes to make up for the loss. A study of the economic implications for Turkey of a customs union with the EU found a loss in tariff revenue of about 1.4 percent of GDP, and it suggested that the fiscal deficit could be reduced only if government cut expenditure or, better still, adopted a value-added tax (VAT) as an alternative to the lost revenue. For this to work, VAT would have to rise by 16.2 percent in each sector of the Turkish economy. If government resorts to borrowing to cover revenue shortfalls, this puts upward pressure on interest rates. On average, private investment and domestic output then fall in favour of imported goods, which creates a balance of trade problem.

Data from the CBN statistical bulletin show that, between 1970 and 2005, tariff revenue made up more than 79 percent of non-oil revenue and 58 percent of total revenue. In 2006 it constituted approximately 30 percent of non-oil revenue and less than 5 percent of total revenue. The data also show that increasing openness painted a gloomy picture of the composition of tariff revenue in Nigeria.

The lukewarm attitude toward these losses in trade and trade-related revenue is mainly attributable to the heavy dependence on oil and to the tendency to treat oil revenue as an item that balances the trade deficit in trade negotiations and trade-related policies. The revenue and expenditure effects of the ACP-EU arrangement will be more deceptive where there is a feeling that oil revenue can act as a cushion against the loss of tariff revenue. Unfortunately, in international trade modelling oil is not regarded as tradable but as a transfer, so any trade policy that relies on oil as a cushion against trade-related problems could be misleading. The present study therefore de-emphasises oil as a major earner of foreign exchange (a “what if” approach) and addresses the implications of dwindling, and eventually zero, revenue from trade when market access increases through reduced or zero tariffs. This approach is plausible because oil has become a resource curse for Nigeria and has turned the economy into one with a Dutch-disease-type syndrome. Recent evidence supports this reading: Oludimu and Alola (2022) found Dutch disease to be present in Nigeria and the resource curse hypothesis to be valid, while Shuaibu and El-Yaqub (2024) found that oil price movements dampen non-oil revenue mobilisation in the short run. The question of using excess oil revenue as a cushion against the drop in trade revenue therefore does not arise.

Oil prices are highly exogenous and are driven by factors of uncertainty, and the net effects are financial instability and a high degree of macroeconomic vulnerability. Nigeria has been ranked among the ten most volatile countries for the years 1961 to 2000, except in the cases of monetary growth and consumer price inflation. With a weak and fragile economy, the impact of volatility is particularly disruptive: it increases management problems and makes planning, growth and development unsustainable. Macroeconomic volatility is therefore a major constraint on development, since it makes planning more difficult and investment riskier. The openness-volatility link is itself contested in the Nigerian evidence. Aigheyisi and Isikhuemen (2018) found, for 1970 to 2015, that the short-run effect of trade openness on output growth volatility in Nigeria is negative, which implies that openness may play some role in reducing volatility in the short run, whereas other work finds that greater openness to trade increases output volatility in developing countries.

Given the direct relationship between the degree of openness, income and expenditure volatility and macroeconomic volatility on the one hand, and the relationship between macroeconomic volatility and inequality on the other, what would be the welfare implication of the zero tariff revenue that would result from the EU-ACP partnership and free trade arrangement? How would it affect output volatility, and through it inequality? And if oil is treated as non-tradable, how would it put pressure on government’s fiscal responsibilities? These and related questions form the core of this study.

1.3 Research Objectives

The study broadly ascertains the impact of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) countries on the structure of government revenue (oil and non-oil revenue). Within this general objective, the study investigates the following specific objectives:

i. The implications of changes in the structure of government revenue for output volatility (the revenue-expenditure transmission effect). ii. The implication of the resulting volatility for driving income inequality in Nigeria. iii. The macroeconomic volatility (output and prices) effect of zero oil revenue (oil as non-tradable) when tariff revenue is zero. iv. The implication of treating oil as non-tradable for inequality-induced volatility, within the framework of zero and non-zero tariff regimes. v. The macroeconomic volatility effect of oil revenue (oil as tradable and non-tradable) when the tariff rate on EU exports is 25 percent. vi. The implication of (v) above for inequality-induced macroeconomic volatility. vii. The direction of causality between revenue (oil and non-oil) volatility and the degree of openness.

1.4 Study Hypothesis

The study tests the hypothesis (under the CGE and PES approaches) that the reduction or elimination of trade-related import taxes on EU exports under the EU-ACP trade policy will reduce the incidence and severity of macroeconomic volatility and inequality.

1.5 Significance of the Research

There are indications that trade liberalisation, and free trade policies in particular, are not economic “gospel truths”, because they carry hidden trade agendas. The empirical literature on trade liberalisation has consistently argued that generalising the impact of free trade at the regional level usually conceals country-specific implications. It has been argued, for example, that recommending the free play of market forces between unequal trading partners would punish poorer commodity exporters while giving undue advantages to rich industrial countries. A related argument, often described as “kicking away the ladder”, holds that nations that have reached the summit of development tend to discard the protective measures that helped them climb, and then urge other nations to adopt free trade, even though no other nation could then sustain free competition with them.

This study will help to shape the policy debate on the expected implications of the EU-ACP proposal for zero tariffs for income distribution and macroeconomic volatility. It also recognises that the general tools and techniques of distributional analysis of trade policy do not remove the fact that each sector has specific characteristics. These characteristics bear on the types of impact, on the transmission channels that deserve particular attention, and on the tools and techniques that are most appropriate. The study will therefore provide the link between general and country-specific trade policy implications. It will also throw more light on the government revenue that will be affected by the elimination of tariffs or the reduction of import prices, especially when oil is taken as non-tradable.

More generally, a study of EPAs will help to assess trade reciprocity and build national consensus on the choices to be made in preferential trade arrangements and future economic partnership agreements, should Nigeria eventually decide to discontinue the EU-ACP agreement. An EPA is not synonymous with an arrangement with the EU, since it is also possible to enter into an EPA with other developed economies. The study can therefore serve as a future reference for any EPA negotiation and as a precondition for seeking alternative trade arrangements if the EU-ACP EPA is discontinued. More importantly, it will help to reveal the offensive agenda (what Nigeria should seek from EPAs) and the defensive agenda (how Nigeria should respond to EPAs) of trade agreements.

1.6 Why Study Macroeconomic Volatility and Income Inequality

There is an old saying that inequality, rather than want, is the cause of trouble. The literature has also shown that inequality carries macroeconomic volatility with it, and that income inequality and macroeconomic volatility can raise poverty. Macroeconomic volatility is potentially an important channel through which income inequality and growth may be mutually related. Countries with high macroeconomic volatility have been found to have lower long-run growth rates, so moderating volatility enhances growth. Moreover, it is argued that the more unequal a society is, the less likely it is to have democratic governments that respect property rights, and that the less equal a country’s distribution of assets is, the slower its economic growth tends to be. The Nigerian evidence on inequality is itself mixed. Odozi and Oyelere (2023) report that consumption inequality in Nigeria has fallen over time even as poverty has risen and regional disparities persist, while Ossai and Bhattarai (2024) note that scholars disagree on whether inequality stimulates growth or worsens poverty, and they test the Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis for Nigeria. Macroeconomic conditions also feed through to distribution: Ogege (2022) finds that depreciation of the naira worsens income distribution in Nigeria, and Udoh et al. (2022) examine how globalisation, through FDI, remittances and trade openness, influences inequality. There is therefore a need for empirical investigation of the causal relationship between macroeconomic volatility and inequality, since views differ on the direction of causality.

The literature also identifies income volatility as a major source of macroeconomic volatility, especially in highly liberalised economies. This is because the size of government and the degree of openness are positively correlated, while both are negatively correlated with domestic income volatility. This implies upward pressure on public spending to cushion against external trade vulnerabilities, and government expenditure plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to substantial external shocks. Two factors explain the link. First, increases in external risk must lead to greater volatility in domestic income and consumption. Second, a larger share of government purchases of goods and services in GDP must reduce income volatility.

There are three possible ways of closing the revenue gap: through oil revenue, through higher taxes or through debt (borrowing). Each creates consumption problems. The lower the revenue from the non-oil sector, the greater the dependence on oil revenue, and the greater the exposure to external shocks, the vulnerability of the economy and the density of macroeconomic volatility. If tax revenue is raised, disposable income is affected, which distorts the chain of production and consumption. Debt, in turn, exerts upward pressure on interest rates and shifts the balance of public and private investment in favour of the public sector, by crowding out the private sector.


REFERENCES

Abanikanda, E. O., & Dada, J. T. (2024). External shocks and macroeconomic volatility in Nigeria: Does financial development moderate the effect? PSU Research Review. https://doi.org/10.1108/PRR-07-2022-0094

Aigheyisi, O. S., & Isikhuemen, A. H. (2018). Trade and financial openness, and output growth volatility: Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Creative Arts. Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta.

Odozi, J. C., & Oyelere, R. U. (2023). Evolution of inequality in Nigeria: A tale of falling inequality, rising poverty, and regional heterogeneity. Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy, 6(4), 297–309.

Ogege, S. (2022). Exchange rate and income distribution in Nigeria. Ilorin Journal of Economic Policy, 9(2), 47–62.

Oludimu, S., & Alola, A. A. (2022). Does crude oil output aid economy boom or curse in Nigeria? An inference from “Dutch disease”. Management of Environmental Quality, 33(2), 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEQ-03-2021-0049

Onogwu, G. O., Bzugu, P. M., & Ani, E. C. (2019). Tariff elimination: Impacts and treatments for resolving Nigeria-EPAs stalemate. JDE (Journal of Developing Economies), 4(2), 91–111.

Ossai, L., & Bhattarai, K. (2024). Exploring the relationship between inequality and economic growth. Journal of Development Economics and Finance, 5(1), 211–233. https://doi.org/10.47509/JDEF.2024.v05i01.10

Shuaibu, M., & El-Yaqub, A. B. (2024). A closer look at the nexus between oil price and non-oil revenue in Nigeria. Iranian Economic Review, 28(2), 369–390.

Udoh, I., Effiong, U., & Ekpe, J. (2022). Globalization and income inequality in Nigeria. International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 9(12), 822–847.

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EU-ACP trade agreementeconomic partnership agreementgovernment revenueoutput volatilityincome inequalityinternational tradetrade liberalizationeconomic integrationNigeria economy

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