ABSTRACT

Aristotle judged constitutions partly by asking whether rulers govern in their own interest or for the common good (Aristotle, Politics, Book III). The same criterion invites a question about how we ourselves would prefer to be governed: by rulers who seek our willing cooperation by persuading us that their rule serves our interests as well, or by rulers who rely wholly on coercion, whether threatened or applied.

In practice, people often cooperate without working through the full set of reasons for a command. They rely on shortcuts such as the law, tradition, an official's directive or precedent, and in doing so they recognise authority. They need not be treated as unreasoning creatures before they comply, although where compliance fails, rulers may turn to force.

Power and authority are often identified in political life, yet they are not one and the same, even though they share features and overlap in practice. The relationship between them is therefore best approached dialectically, by examining them as opposed concepts and seeking an understanding that does justice to both.

Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought turns on the interplay of power and authority. He recognised that power operates without regard for morality, and he also understood how authority, when anchored in legitimacy, gives rule a moral and stabilising quality. Aristotle would expect a thinker confronted with these two to seek the virtuous mean, and Machiavelli's reputation leaves open whether he ever did. This study subjects the concepts of power and authority to rational scrutiny in light of the thought of Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527).

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Power and authority are among the basic concepts of political thought, and each is rich enough to support an inquiry of its own. They are also frequently run together, which is why any attempt to treat them jointly provokes dispute.

In ordinary terms, power is the ability to do something, while authority is the power or right to command. The distinction needs to be kept clear because the two words are often confused in speech and in thought. We say that a statute gives a minister 'power' to act in a certain way when we mean that it gives him authority, and we speak of someone exceeding his 'legal powers' or acting ultra vires when 'authority' would express the point more accurately. Contemporary political philosophy preserves the same distinction in a more developed form. A body such as a state may be effective, holding de facto authority, without being legitimate, and legitimate authority is usually understood as differing from the merely effective kind because it actually holds the right to rule (Peter, 2019). Legitimacy can also be understood descriptively, as people's beliefs about whether authority is justified, in the manner of Weber, or normatively, as a benchmark for justifying the exercise of political power (Peter, 2019).

The looseness of usage appears at the beginning of modern theorising about sovereignty. Jean Bodin, writing in the sixteenth century, described sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth, the supreme power to command (Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, Book I, ch. 8). His wording raises an interpretive question. By 'absolute power' does he mean the ability to issue commands that are actually obeyed, which would be power in the strict sense? Or does he mean the right or entitlement to issue commands and to have them obeyed, which would be authority? Anyone has the power to issue a command, but not everyone is entitled to do so in a given situation, and not everyone is able, or entitled, to see that his commands are carried out. Bodin's account of sovereignty as a whole suggests that he has the second meaning in mind, although the phrase he uses suggests the first.

Machiavelli confronts the same problem from a different direction. In The Prince, he gives a set of prescriptions for the successful management of a state through the acquisition and maintenance of power (Machiavelli, 1988). Nederman (2014) notes that Machiavelli criticises at length a moralistic view of authority, according to which rulership rests on moral goodness and legitimacy. For Machiavelli, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command, goodness does not guarantee power, and a good person has no greater authority by virtue of being good. On this reading, the supposed legitimate right to rule adds nothing to the actual possession of power (Nederman, 2014). Yet Machiavelli did not value power for its own sake. He stressed the need for stable political order and unity, and in his other major work, the Discourses on Livy, he turned from the security of the state to liberty and republican government. The tension between the two works is part of what makes his treatment of power and authority difficult to settle.

Recent scholarship has kept Machiavelli at the centre of debate and has approached him from several angles. He has been considered as a philosopher in his own right (Baluch, 2018), as a theorist of democratic innovation (Holman, 2018), as an analyst of the orders of violence in political life (Winter, 2018) and as a political thinker whose arguments reward close reading (Zuckert, 2017). These studies show that his concepts of power and authority cannot be understood in isolation from his broader aims, and that a careful conceptual analysis of them is still needed.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

A problem may be understood as a proposition stating something to be done. The task here is to analyse power and authority, both in themselves and within the thought of Machiavelli. Analysis means breaking something into its constituent parts to examine its structure and functions. For that purpose the two concepts must be examined separately and then in relation to one another, since their relation cannot be judged unless each is first understood.

Several questions follow. What are the structure and functions of power and of authority respectively? Is either superior to or more important than the other? To what extent can or should one depend on the other? Are they one and the same, and if not, how and to what extent do they differ? Who or what can exercise power and authority, and what are the limits of each? Why power, and why authority? These questions are numerous, and the study addresses as many of the most necessary ones as it can.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

Power and authority are often confused, and Machiavelli's conception of them is often confused in the same way. The purpose of this study is therefore fourfold: to clarify as far as possible the nature and extent of power and authority as individual concepts; to examine them in relation to one another; to determine how Machiavelli understands them; and to present them in a clearer and less complicated form for the benefit of readers interested in political thought.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Events in governance are often reported and discussed, but only readers with at least a basic grounding in political thought, particularly from a philosophical standpoint, can fully grasp what such events mean without being misled by appearances. Power and authority are not all there is to politics, yet they occupy a central place in any account of government.

By clarifying the two concepts and revealing more about them than is immediately obvious, the study aims to offer a method for interpreting political action, including the more disguised kinds of political transaction. It will also contribute to the continuing scholarly discussion of Machiavelli's political thought.

1.5 Scope of the Study

Machiavelli is the central figure of the study, but the analysis will occasionally move to other thinkers where doing so helps to make a point. Machiavelli's best-known work, The Prince, will be analysed in Chapter Three. In it he sets out prescriptions for managing a state through the procurement of power (Machiavelli, 1988). He also uses the word 'authority' at various points to express his meaning, and the study will therefore examine whether, for him, power and authority are the same.

1.6 Methodology

The study uses analytical, critical and dialectical methods of philosophical inquiry. The analytical method breaks the concepts of power and authority into their components. The critical method tests Machiavelli's claims and the interpretations of them against objections. The dialectical method sets the two concepts against each other in order to arrive at an understanding that reconciles what is sound in each. The primary texts are Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses on Livy, supported by recent scholarship on his thought and by contemporary discussions of political authority and legitimacy.

References

Baluch, F. (2018). Machiavelli as philosopher. The Review of Politics, 80(2), 289–300. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034670517001097

Holman, C. (2018). Machiavelli and the politics of democratic innovation. University of Toronto Press.

Machiavelli, N. (1988). The Prince (Q. Skinner & R. Price, Eds.). Cambridge University Press.

Nederman, C. J. (2014). Niccolò Machiavelli. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2014 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/machiavelli/

Peter, F. (2019). Political legitimacy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/legitimacy/

Winter, Y. (2018). Machiavelli and the orders of violence. Cambridge University Press.

Zuckert, C. H. (2017). Machiavelli's politics. University of Chicago Press.